Auction fever : theory and experimental evidence by Ehrhart, Karl-Martin et al.
SONDERFORSCHUNGSBEREICH 504
Rationalita¨tskonzepte,
Entscheidungsverhalten und
o¨konomische Modellierung
Universita¨t Mannheim
L 13,15
68131 Mannheim
No. 08-27
Auction Fever: Theory and Experimental
Evidence
Karl-Martin Ehrhart∗
and Marion Ott∗∗
and Susanne Abele∗∗∗
December 2008
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of
Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Giulio Bottazzi, Clemens Puppe, and Reinhard
Selten for helpful comments.
∗Universitaet Karlsruhe, email: ehrhart@wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de
∗∗Universitaet Karlsruhe, email: ott@wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de
∗∗∗Miami University, Department of Psychology, email: abeles@muohio.edu
Auction Fever: Theory and
Experimental Evidence∗
Karl-Martin Ehrhart† Marion Ott‡ Susanne Abele§
November 2008
It is not a secret that certain auction formats yield on average higher prices
than others. The phenomenon that dynamic auctions are more likely to elicit
higher bids than static one-shot auctions is often associated with the term
“auction fever.” On a psychological level, we consider the so-called pseudo-
endowment effect as largely responsible for peoples’ tendency to submit higher
bids, potentially amplified by the source-dependence effect.
The phenomenon of auction fever is replicated in an experimental investi-
gation of different auction formats within a private values framework where
bidders have private but incomplete knowledge of their valuation for a hypo-
thetical good. We suggest this assumption to be more realistic than definite
private values, as assumed in the traditional IPV model. An additional ex-
perimental investigation within the traditional IPV framework does not either
reveal any indication for the appearance of auction fever.
On the basis of our experimental observations we present a model of refe-
rence-dependent utility theory that comprehends the phenomenon by assum-
ing that bidders’ reference points are shifted by the pseudo-endowment and
the source-dependence effect.
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1
21 Introduction
The fact that many Internet auction providers and other web sites on Internet auctions
advice bidders to protect themselves against auction fever and to avoid suffering from this
“disease” indicates that auction fever is a widespread phenomenon.1
Bidding fever or auction fever may be defined as bidding over a pre-selected bidding limit
(Ku, 2000) or as “the emotionally charged and frantic behavior of auction participants
that can result in overbidding” (Ku, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005, p. 90)2. We differ
from these definitions since we assume that, on the one hand, people usually have some
idea about their valuation of the object on sale, but, on the other hand, do not really
commit to a pre-selected and well-defined limit. Our interests are in the causative reasons
in a technical way that result from the auction design, and to give empirical evidence for
the link between these and the psychological constructs. Therefore, we see auction fever
as a phenomenon, whose appearance can be influenced by the auction format and that
induces bidders to bid higher in some format than in others where it does not appear or
occurs less severely. In this paper we want to use this definition of auction fever as it is
less detailed about the psychological background of the observed behavior and makes no
assumptions about pre-selected bidding limits.
The induced difference in bidding behavior might be explained in many different ways.
Possible explanations for the occurrence of auction fever are competitive arousal, escala-
tion of commitment, and a pseudo- or quasi-endowment effect, or an attachment effect.
Auction dynamics are supposed to be a precondition for these effects to occur. By auc-
tion dynamics we mean a multi-stage and multiple-bid process where bidders observe an
increasing price in the auction and have the opportunity to raise their bids during the
auction.
The competitive arousal hypothesis states that diverse factors in an auction (e.g., ri-
valry, time pressure) impact the decision-making of bidders due to increasing arousal (Ku
et al., 2005). Escalation of commitment results from the justification of previous decisions
by investing more instead of leaving the auction (Ku et al., 2005) or might alternatively
be explained by loss aversion.3
Two more possible explanations for the occurrence of auction fever are based on prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and an extension thereof. The first explanation is
a pseudo- or quasi-endowment effect. The term pseudo-endowment effect describes an
effect similar to the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) but with the difference that there
is no real ownership of the item. Nevertheless, the current high bidder might develop a
psychological ownership of the item and thus have an other valuation for the item than
without being the current high bidder (Ariely & Simonson, 2003). The endowment effect
describes the observation that the minimum compensation that people demand to give
up a good is with respect to several measures higher than the maximum amount they
1For example: “Set your buying limit before the auction starts DON’T get bidding fever, if the
item goes above your limit, FORGET it!” (http://www.ukauctionguides.co.uk/hints tips.htm,
11.04.2006), “It’s true that ‘auction fever’ sometimes grips a gallery and propels bidding lev-
els beyond the real value of certain coins. This, of course, is a plus if you happen to be
the person who consigned those coins for sale, but something to be avoided if you’re a buyer.”
(http://www.pocketchangelottery.com/article376.htm, 11.04.2006)
2Different from this definition, the term “auction fever” is also used to describe the attractiveness of
auctions as a buying mechanism and the increased range of application of auctions.
3For the reinterpretation of escalation of commitment in terms of prospect theory and loss aversion see
Whyte (1986).
3are willing to pay to acquire the same good (the willingness to pay-willingness to accept
disparity). For example the experiments of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990)4 with
coffee mugs and pens have shown that subjects valuate a coffee mug or a pen given to
them by the experimenter on average higher than subjects that are given the possibility
to buy such a mug or a pen.5 In auction environments a related effect, called pseudo-
endowment effect, is assumed to occur. When a bidder is the current high bidder in an
auction she might feel a bit like already owning the item. If another bidder outbids her,
she might consider this as taking away her item. To get the item that she considers as
her item back, she might be willing to pay more than she was willing to pay for the item
before the auction started, and before she was the high bidder for some period of time.
Another plausible explanation of auction fever, that is also related to prospect theory,
bases on the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). In their model of reference-dependent
preferences, which is an extension of prospect theory, the reference point, from which gains
and losses are measured, is determined by expectations about the outcome. Applying this
approach to an auction framework leads us to the following argumentation: if a bidder
is high bidder, she might expect to win the auction with higher probability. Thus, the
high bidder has an other reference point than a bidder who is not high bidder. In this
case auction fever would be due to an attachment effect caused by an increased subjective
belief of buying the item. A higher probability of buying an item increases the sense of
loss if the bidder does not win the auction. This might result in an increased willingness
to pay and thus, in higher bids.6 Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we name this effect
attachment effect.
Thus, the pseudo-endowment effect results from increased attachment because the item
becomes part of the psychological endowment. The attachment effect results from an
increase in the expected probability of winning and a resulting change of the reference
point. Both effects are due to a change of the reference point and loss aversion.
Furthermore, Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) find, that people tend to value an
item more highly, when they received this item due to a better performance in some task
compared to a situation where they received it by chance.7 They name this effect the
source-dependence effect.
4For earlier experimental evidence on the endowment effect with lottery tickets see for example Knetsch
and Sinden (1984), for an overview see Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991).
5A recent study by Johnson, Ha¨ubl, and Keinan (2007) focuses on the psychological foundations of the
endowment effect. According to their theory and their experimental results, the endowment effect
is the result of different sequences of queries that sellers and buyers (choosers) pose. Queries focus
on advantages and disadvantages of trade and each decision maker asks himself questions concerning
his status quo first before considering the opposite state. A seller asks himself first value increasing
questions considering positive aspects of the item and negative aspects of money, whereas the buyer
does first focus on negative aspects of the item and positive aspects of money, which are both value
decreasing. Assuming that the first query leads to suppression of answers to the second, this may
lead to the endowment effect.
6In the consumer example of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), the willingness to pay a given price depends
on the price the consumer expects and the consumer’s belief (probability) of buying the good. Thus,
the willingness to pay depends on the probability which the consumer assigns to the event that the
price lies below his expected price.
7Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) find a positive source effect that strengthens the endowment effect
comparing situations of distributing a good by chance and distributing it dependent on a positive
result in a task, but they find a negative source effect comparing situations of distributing a good by
chance and distributing it dependent on a negative result in a task. In the second case of negative
source dependence the endowment effect completely disappeared. In our experiment only positive
source dependence may occur.
4In a laboratory experiment, we test the impact of auction dynamics on the results
and hypotheses on increasing bids associated with the pseudo-endowment effect and the
attachment effect as well as the source-dependence effect. In the following, we do not
distinguish between the pseudo-endowment effect and the attachment effect. In our ex-
periment both effects are indistinguishable and we will refer to auction fever caused by
these effects by the term pseudo-endowment effect. Nevertheless, we should not forget
that the rational expectations-reference point model might be an alternative explanation.
The results of some empirical and experimental studies sustain the hypothesis that
the pseudo-endowment effect occurs in auctions. Heyman, Orhun, and Ariely (2004) and
Wolf, Arkes, and Muhanna (2005) examine effects of different durations of being the high
bidder. Heyman et al. (2004) find in a survey-based experiment with fictitious second-
price auctions and in an ascending auction of real goods with a fixed number of bidding
rounds and bidding against five computerized bidding agents (unknown to the subjects),
that a duration of being the high bidder manipulation results in higher bids in the group
with the longer duration. Similarly, Wolf et al. (2005) find in an empirical study on eBay
Motors’ auctions, that people who were longer high bidder in an auction do more often
re-bid, and in a laboratory experiment that people who examined a mug longer stated a
higher maximum willingness to pay than those who held the mug for a short period of
time in their hands. All these studies are designed from a psychological point of view.
A game theoretical model on loss averse bidders that is thus related to the pseudo-
endowment, effect is the model of Dodonova and Khoroshilov (2004). They find that
rational bidders, who anticipate the higher valuation of the item for them once they
are high bidder, will include this anticipated change into their consideration and behave
differently which has in particular effects on their entry decisions. This, in turn, has
the effect that a first-bidder advantage occurs (because the second bidder of two bidders
might not enter once an other bidder has already bid) and it has an impact on the optimal
reserve price of the seller.
In our paper, we present a model of reference-dependent utility theory that comprehends
the phenomenon of auction fever by modeling bidders’ reference points being shifted by
the pseudo-endowment effect and the source-dependence effect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes two experimental settings includ-
ing theoretical considerations as well as the presentation and analysis of the experimental
results. In Section 3 we present our model of reference-dependent utility theory. Section
4 concludes.
2 An experiment on auction fever
In this section we present our experiment, that is designated to look into the phenomenon
of auction fever. For this purpose, we investigate different auction formats within a private
values framework. Beside the well-known IPV setting with well-defined private valuations
we additionally focus our interest on a modified IPV setting where bidders are not fully
aware of their private values at the time of the auction.
2.1 Different auction formats and the auction fever hypothesis
With our experiment we test the hypothesis that the design of an auction has an impact
on individual bidding behavior in the way that some auction formats induce players to bid
more conservatively while other formats induce more aggressive bidding behavior. The
5latter phenomenon is referred to as auction fever. Here, we distinguish between a static
auction (sealed bid auction) and dynamic auctions (English style auctions), which differ
with respect to the selection of current high bidders in the course of the auction.
In each auction, a hypothetical good (i.e. a ship) is offered to three bidders, each
assigned the role of a shipping company owner. A limit price bmin of 500 Experimental
Currency Units (ExCU) and a constant increment ∆b equal to 5 ExCU are set. When the
auction ends, the winner is paid her private valuation minus the price plus a lump-sum
payment of 200 ExCU that all subjects receive. Prices are determined as second price plus
one increment or a small variation thereof, such that the incentives in the four treatments
match. In the following, we describe the four different auction formats, labeled by A1,
A2, A3, and A4. For more details see the translation of the instructions in Appendix C.
• Auction format A1: In the first type of auction, participants are asked to submit
their upper bidding limit only once. A bidding mechanism then outbids the bids
against each other like in an English auction. Strictly speaking, bidders face a
second-price or Vickrey auction in which the bidder with the highest bid receives
the item and has to pay the second highest bid (Vickrey, 1961). In case of a tie,
the winning bidder is randomly drawn from the set of the highest bidders and has
to pay the highest bid.
However, for this type of auction it is well known that participants tend to overbid
their dominant strategies in the case of private values settings in which bidders
are aware of their valuations (e.g., Kagel, Harstad, & Levin, 1987; Kagel & Levin,
1993; Kagel, 1995; Harstad, 2000). Therefore, in order to prevent such distortions,
our subjects are told that they enter the bidding limit of a computerized agent
who bids on their behalf in an English auction. Technically, the auction institution
is a dynamic (English) proxy auction (Seifert, 2006). Even if the distortion was
not completely eliminated by this procedure, the effect would work against our
hypothesis. Note that the auctions in half of the groups in Treatment A1 are
carried out under a pure second price rule (pricing rule 1, PR1). In other groups
of this treatment, the winning bidders have to pay the second highest bid plus
one increment (pricing rule 2, PR2). This differentiation is caused by the required
comparability of our four auction formats.
• Auction format A2: In the second type of auction, we introduce dynamics to the
auction design. In this Japanese-style auction, which is also called a ticker auction,
the price increases incrementally and bidders are asked at every stage if they accept
the current price level. If a bidder does not accept the price within 50 seconds, he
has to quit the auction at this stage. Bidders are not informed about the number of
remaining bidders. The bidding process stops, when at least all but one bidder have
quit the auction. As before in Treatment A1, in the case that one bidder remains in
the auction, this bidder receives the item and has to pay the price of the penultimate
stage (PR1) or the last stage (PR2), respectively. In the case that all remaining
bidders quit the auction at the same stage, the winning bidder is randomly drawn
from the set of these bidders and has to pay the price of the last stage.
• Auction format A3: This type of auction is a variation of A2. As in auction
A2, the price increases incrementally and bidders are asked at every stage if they
accept the current price. Additionally, at every price level, a current high bidder
is randomly chosen out of the set of accepting bidders. The process stops, when
6none of the other bidders accepts the next price level within 50 seconds. Then the
last high bidder receives the item and has to pay the price of the stage before the
auction stops, that is, the stage where she was designated as high bidder.8
• Auction format A4: This dynamic auction is a computerized form of an English
(ticker) auction. As before, the price increases incrementally. On every price level,
the bidder who first accepts the price is designated as current high bidder. Then the
price increases by one increment and is shown for five seconds (counted downwards
on the screen). After the five seconds the button to accept the new price is enabled
for the other bidders. The process stops when the new price is not accepted by any
other bidder within 45 seconds.
In order to assure that subjects are able to read the screen and recognize the current price,
the information screen is shown for at least five seconds on every price level of the dynamic
auctions A2, A3, and A4. In an A2 or A3 auction, for example, even if all bidders accept
a price level in no time, the screen would not be updated before five seconds have passed.
This delay is also introduced to reduce the speed in the dynamic auction such that bidders
do not feel time pressure and to assure that bidders have enough time to become aware of
the fact that they are the current high bidder in A3 and A4. Strahilevitz and Loewenstein
(1998) find a positive influence of the duration of ownership on the endowment effect and
Heyman et al. (2004) find the same in an auction environment concerning the duration
of being the high bidder. As five seconds are rather short the main aspect of this feature
in our experiment is not duration of ownership, but the possibility to become aware of
the fact of being the current high bidder or, in the words of Strahilevitz and Loewenstein
(1998): “It is not ownership per se, but awareness of ownership that causes reference
point shifts.”
In auctions of types A2, A3, and A4, compared to A1, bidders actively participate in a
dynamic auction. Thus, according to our auction fever hypothesis, we expect higher bids
in these auctions than in A1. Furthermore, in A3, we allow for the pseudo-endowment
effect as the current high bidder might feel a bit like already owning the item and thus
might have a higher valuation for the good than before and therefore we expect higher
bids than in A2. Moreover, we intend to evoke a stronger pseudo-endowment effect in A4
than in Treatment A3, as a bidder achieves the current high bidder position by virtue of
her own strength since she becomes current high bidder by being the fastest bidder in a
stage of the dynamic auction. Hence, we expect an additional increase in the bids due to
the source-dependence effect. Table 1 gives an overview of the four auction formats.
In the introduction we described two more factors, competitive arousal and escalation
of commitment, that might lead to higher bids. We do not expect these two factors
to have an impact on our results for the following reasons. Factors that might lead to
competitive arousal that Ku et al. (2005) mention are uniqueness of being first, social
facilitation, rivalry, and time pressure. There is no special hype about our auctions and
even if there was one it would be the same for all treatments. Thus, uniqueness of an
auction is not an argument here. Participants decide privately and anonymously. Social
facilitation therefore should not be relevant. In addition, even if it was relevant, it would
be the same in all treatments. Rivalry, in contrast to the standard competition argument
8Please note that the difference between the auction formats A2 and A3 is rather small, as the only
difference is the random selection of the current high bidder in A3.
7Table 1: Different auction formats and their expected bid-increasing effects
Auction
format
Characteristics Expected effects
A1 Proxy auction
A2 Dynamic Japanese-style auction Dynamics effect
A3 Dynamic auction with randomly
designated current high bidder
Dynamics effect and
pseudo-endowment effect
A4 Dynamic English-style auction Dynamics effect,
pseudo-endowment effect,
and source-dependence effect
meaning that the less bidders are left, the more a bidder will bid,9 should be the same
in auctions of type A2–A4 and, more importantly, we only have groups of three bidders
and bidders are not informed about the number of bidders left. As mentioned above,
we tried to reduce time pressure in assuring that before leaving the auction every bidder
had 50 seconds to think about the decision not to accept a price level. Justification of
investments leading to escalation of commitment seems also not to be relevant, as even if
there was a high investment in coming to our lab and thinking about the instruction, the
differences between the treatments, if any, should be minor. That is, these factors might
be relevant in auctions in general, but they are unlikely to be important for comparisons
of treatments in our experiment.
Recapitulating, our hypothesis is, that the auction prices increase from auction format
to auction format, where A1 and A2 differ with respect to auction dynamics, auction
format A3 includes auction dynamics and the possibility of a pseudo-endowment effect, the
dynamic auction in A4 allows for the pseudo-endowment effect and the source-dependence
effect. In each case the direction of the expected effects is the direction of higher bids.
Implementation and organization of the experiment
The experiment was run at the University of Karlsruhe, Germany, with randomly selected
students from various disciplines. Every subject participated in one auction with two
other bidders (that is, groups of three bidders). When designing the experiment, we
deliberately decided that each subject participates in one single auction only. Since we
want the subjects to concentrate on one auction and since our auctions are very simple and
easy to understand, we prefer this design over a setting where each subject participates in
several consecutive auctions. We consider it as advantageous for our investigation, that
each subject is confronted with one payoff relevant task and does not have several chances.
Altogether, we implemented seven treatments with twelve auctions (groups) per treat-
ment (see Table 2). Each treatment is conducted in two sessions with 6 groups (18 sub-
jects) in each session. Thus, 36 subjects participated in each treatment and altogether
252 subjects in the experiment.
As can be seen in Table 2 the treatments can be separated in the two classes “indepen-
dent private valuations (IPV) with certain valuations” and “IPV with uncertain valua-
9The reason is that the bidder bids more aggressively when there is only one competitor left to beat
because she thinks that she is closer to winning than when there are still a lot of bidders in the
auction.
8tions” which is indicated in the treatment names by a “c” or a “u”, respectively. In the
temporal sequence of treatments the u-treatments were conducted before the c-treatments.
From the experience of the u-treatments and our hypotheses on the c-treatments we con-
cluded that auction format A3 would give no new insights, such that we neglected a
possible treatment A3c. The presentation in this paper follows the logical order of first
describing and discussing the c-treatments and then turning to the u-treatments.
Table 2: Number of groups (subjects) in the different treatments
Auction
format
IPV with certain
valuations
IPV with uncer-
tain valuations
Sum
A1 A1c: 12 (36) A1u: 12 (36) 24 (72)
A2 A2c: 12 (36) A2u: 12 (36) 24 (72)
A3 A3u: 12 (36) 12 (36)
A4 A4c: 12 (36) A4u: 12 (36) 24 (72)
Sum 36 (108) 48 (144) 84 (252)
The experiment was computerized. Each subject was seated at a computer terminal
which was separated from the other subjects’ terminals. The subjects received written
instructions, which were also read out by an experimental assistant (see Appendix C).
Before the experiment started, each subject had to answer several questions at her/his
computer terminal with respect to the instructions. After all subjects had given the
right answers to all questions they were given their private information and then the
auction started. No communication was permitted. Subjects could not identify which
members of the session they actually interacted with. The experimental sessions lasted
less than one hour. At the end of an experimental session, the subjects were paid in cash
according to their profits in the game. The conversion rate was 5 Euro for 100 ExCU. The
average, minimum, and maximum payments realized were e 10.82, e 3.85, and e 18.10,
respectively.
2.2 Auction fever in the IPV framework
To begin with, the first part of the experiment addresses the question whether auction
fever occurs within an typical IPV framework, that is, at the time of the auction each
bidder has an exact valuation of the item, which is only known to her and independent
of the other bidders’ valuations.
IPV setting with certain private valuations
In this setting we initially neglect the somewhat artificial auction format A3 and restrict
our analysis to the three established formats A1, A2, and A4, which we implement in
an IPV environment with different private valuations. Since each bidder is aware of her
valuation at the time of the auction, that is, there is certainty about the own valuation,
these treatments are labeled by A1c, A2c, and A4c (see Table 2). Each auction (group)
consists of three bidders B1, B2, and B3. Since we only conduct incentive-compatible
auctions (see below), where we want subjects to concentrate on their individual values,
we deliberately do not disclose the distribution of the values; subjects only know that
9their values are different. We conduct twelve auctions (groups) per treatment. Thus, 108
subjects participate in 36 auctions in this setting.
In each auction we use the same value configuration (see Table 3), which we choose
for three reasons: First, the two low valuations 612 and 617 of B1 and B2 are very close
(difference of one increment only) in order to arrange a competitive situation for the
bidders who are expected to determine the price. Second, the large gap between B3’s
valuation of 652 and the two low values provides an environment that allows subjects of
type B1 or B2, who suffer from auction fever, to “succumb this disease” and raise their
bid far above their valuation, impelled by bidder B3. Third, each value lies between two
possible price steps as bids are multiples of five. As a consequence, a bidder has to decide
to bid below or above her valuation and cannot simply use it as an anchor.
Table 3: Bidders’ private information about their individual valuations in the certainty
treatments
Bidder Valuation
B1 612
B2 617
B3 652
Theoretical considerations
To allow for comparability of the treatments, we have to assure that from a theoretical
point of view a rational bidder behaves in the same way in all three different auction
formats, that is, she submits the same (maximum) bid in all four treatments.
If we neglect the increment, it is well-known that in an IPV-framework each type of
the here considered auction formats A1–A4 is an incentive-compatible mechanism, that
is, bidding her individual valuation constitutes each bidder’s (weakly) dominant strategy.
As a consequence, in the equilibrium of an auction, the bidder with the highest valuation
receives the item and has to pay the second highest valuation. Thus, an auction price of
617 ExCU is expected under all formats if increments are neglected.
By taking into account that in our auctions the price continuously increases by an in-
crement of 5 ExCU, we have to adjust our theoretical considerations a little bit. The
increment does not have an influence on (rational) bidding behavior in A3 and A4, but
it may have in A1 and A2. In A3 and A4, the private valuation determines a bidder’s
benchmark, independent of the increment. Since the valuations 612, 617, and 652 lie be-
tween two auction prices, a bidder leaves the auction when the price exceeds her valuation
for the first time, that is, at the auction price 615, 620, or 655, respectively. However, the
rules of the auctions in A1 and A2 may induce bidders, dependent on the pricing rule, to
deviate (a little bit) from their valuation. This is caused by the fact that in case of a tie
the winning bidder is randomly chosen out of the set of the highest bidders. To be more
precise: if the winning bidder has to pay the last announced price (pricing rule 1, PR1),
she may have a small incentive to stop bidding on a price level below her valuation. On
the other hand, if the unique highest bidder has to pay the penultimate price (pricing rule
2, PR2), she may have a small incentive to bid more than her valuation (at maximum one
increment). Although we expect these effects as rather small and negligible, we establish
10
both pricing rules in Treatment A1c as well in A2c by running half of the groups under
PR1 and the other six groups under PR2 in order to compensate and control for these
effects.
Experimental results of Treatments A1c, A2c, and A4c
First, there is no evidence that the two pricing rules PR1 and PR2, which we both use
in the Treatments A1c and A2c, lead to different prices.10 Thus, we take the liberty of
pooling the two samples of Treatment A1c and of Treatment A2c, respectively.
Table 4: Average auction prices (in ExCU)
Treatment A1c A2c A4c
Average price 617.08 620.42 621.25
Median price 615 615 620
Table 4 reflects the clear result of the certainty setting: the average auction prices in the
three treatments are close together within an one-increment interval which also includes
the theoretically predicted result. Unsurprisingly, there are no statistical differences.11
Table 5 reveals that 22 of 36 auctions end according to the game-theoretical prediction
with an auction price of 615 or 620. Moreover, nine other auctions lead to either 610
or 625. Hence, the result of 31 auctions is considered to be (approximately) in line with
theory. This observation suggests that most of the subjects are guided by their individual
valuation, independent of the auction format, which is additionally supported by Table 11
and Table 12 in Appendix A. Note that 28 of 36 auctions are won by bidders of type B3
as theoretically predicted. This particularly applies for the twelve A4c-auctions, where
all but one auction is won by B3 and ten A4c-auctions end “theoretically properly” (see
also Table 5). This observation does not support any action fever hypotheses, but it is
seen as consistent with the empirical hypothesis that the format of the English auction
guides bidders to execute their dominant bidding strategy better than other formats.
The applied χ2-test, however, does not reveal significant differences in the distributions
between the treatments.12
An analysis of the individual bids reveals that most of the subjects bid according to
the dominant strategy. In Treatment A1c, 15 of 36 subjects bid exactly in line with
their valuation.13 14 subjects bid less than their valuation, while seven subjects bid more
than their valuation, where four of these submit a bid on the next price level above
their valuation. In comparison to the aforementioned previous studies we do not find
systematic bidding over the private values, which may be attributed to the different
auction design (description of the auction as a dynamic proxy auction and nondisclosure
of the distribution of valuations to the subjects).
10Applying U -tests, we do not find differences between the results of the PR1- and the PR2-groups in
Treatment A1c and in Treatment A2c:
Treatment A1c: sample sizes: 6, 6; average prices: 618.33, 615.83; test statistics: 10; p-value: > 0.3.
Treatment A2c: sample sizes: 6, 6; average prices: 622.50, 618.33; test statistics: 10.5; p-value: > 0.3.
11Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks: test statistics: 2.444; p-value: 0.3.
12Table 5: χ2-test: degree of freedom: 4; test statistics: 5.5; p-value > 0.2.
Table 12: χ2-test: degree of freedom: 4; test statistics: 5.5; p-value > 0.2.
13In the groups of Treatment A1c under PR1 a bid is considered as in line with the valuation if it deviates
by -2 or +3 from the valuation, whereas under PR2 only a deviation of -2 counts.
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Table 5: Deviation of the auction price from the theoretically predicted price
< = > Sum
Treatment A1c 4 (33.3%) 6 (50.0%) 2 (16.7%) 12
A2c 4 (33.3%) 6 (50.0%) 2 (16.7%) 12
A4c 0 (0%) 10 (83.3%) 2 (16.7%) 12
Sum 8 (22.2%) 22 (61.1%) 6 (16.7%) 36
The two dynamic auctions do also not induce subjects to bid more aggressively: in
Treatment A2c, only two subjects are observed who exceed their valuation; in Treatment
A4c, two of the three subjects, who bid more than their values, submit their last bid at
the next price step above their valuation. Obviously, almost all of our subjects seem to
be “healthy” and cannot be seduced by the auction format to raise their bids (far) above
their valuation.
Result 1 In an IPV-framework (with certain private valuations) there is no evidence that
incentive-compatible auction formats induce bidders to systematically bid more than their
valuation. Hence, there is no indication for auction fever if bidders are aware of their
individual valuation.
Furthermore, the fact, that in all auctions with certain private valuations subjects
predominately bid according to their private valuation, provides evidence that the subjects
understand well about the auction formats. This observation supports our decision of
designing an experiment where each subject participates in one single auction only in
order to concentrate her full attention to this auction.
2.3 Auction fever with private but uncertain valuations
Giving players a fixed evaluation for an object that is up for auction, is based on the
classical economic model, which assumes that individuals walk through life with fixed
evaluations about any commodity, which can be retrieved on demand. In a second study
we base our approach on empirical research on human behavior, and assume that evalua-
tions of objects are not fixed, but uncertain and rather subjectively constructed (Edwards,
1954, 1962; Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
For these reasons, we find it plausible rather than giving participants a fixed value as
their evaluation to give them a distribution over an interval of the valuations. Here, we
decide in favor for a “virtual” good with an given value distribution instead of a real good
for the sake of controllability and comparability. For this purpose, in comparison to the
IPV setting with certain values we change only one component of the experimental design:
bidders knowledge about their private valuation at the time of the auction. Hence, we
test the same auction formats as before in an IPV framework with uncertain valuations.
That is, bidders are not exactly aware of their individual valuations, which, however, are
still independent.
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IPV setting with uncertain private valuations
In the “uncertainty treatments” bidders have private but incomplete information of their
valuation at the time of the auction, that is, they know that their valuation lies uniformly
distributed within a given interval which is private information. The valuation of the
winning bidder is realized right after the auction ends. Due to a bidder’s uncertainty about
her own valuation, the treatments are labeled by A1u, A2u, A3u, and A4u. As before,
three bidders participate in each auction. Since we conduct twelve auctions (groups) per
treatment, 144 subjects participate in 48 auctions in this setting (see Table 2).
The three bidders B1, B2, and B3 in a group have different distributions (i.e., different
intervals) and they know that they are different. However, they do not know other bidders’
distributions. Note, although a bidder is uncertain about her valuation of the item (i.e.,
she only knows her distribution), the item does not have common value but only private
values properties. This is due to the fact that a bidder is only aware of her own distribution
(private information) and knows that the other bidders’ distributions are different and
independent. In the uncertainty treatments we use the same three different intervals in
all groups (see Table 6). Note that the expected values (i.e., the means of the intervals)
correspond to the private values of the certainty treatments (Table 3).
Table 6: Bidders’ private information about their individual valuations in the uncertainty
treatments
Bidder Valuation interval Expected valuation
(uniform distribution)
B1 [512, 712] 612
B2 [517, 717] 617
B3 [552, 752] 652
Theoretical considerations
As in the certainty treatments, we have to assure, that theory predicts the same (maxi-
mum) bid of a rational bidder with a given distribution of her valuation for the item in
the four auction formats, to allow for comparability of the treatments.
To show this, let u : R → R denote a representative bidder’s von Neumann/Morgen-
stern utility function and let V denote the random variable of the bidder’s valuation and
F (v) with v ∈ [v, v¯] its distribution. Note that the valuation of the item for the bidder
is determined after the auction in case the bidder is the winner. Hence, our bidder does
not know the exact value of the item when she participates in the auction but she knows
the distribution F (v) of her value. The distribution F (v) is private information of the
bidder and thus not known by the other bidders and vice versa, that is, our bidder does
not know other bidders’ distributions. Therefore, our bidder can only build subjective
beliefs about other bidders’ valuations and their bidding behavior in the auction. Note
that we have to take into account that a bidder’s beliefs may depend on the auction
format, that is, a bidder might be induced to update her beliefs during the course of a
dynamic auction like the auction formats in A2, A3, and A4. A bidder’s belief about
the distribution of the other bidders’ highest bid, denoted by the random variable R, is
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described by the distribution Gk(r) and its derivative gk(r), where k ∈ {A1, A2, A3, A4}.
The bidder’s decision variable b is the (highest) bid she is willing to submit in the auction.
Our bidder’s expected utility U(b) in all four types of auctions k ∈ {A1, A2, A3, A4} is
then given by
U(b) =
∫ b
bmin
∫ v¯
v
u(w + v − r) dF (v) dGk(r) + (1−Gk(b))u(w), (1)
where w denotes bidder’s wealth position before the auction. The maximization of U(b)
with respect to b implies the first order condition ∂U(b)/∂b = 0 which leads to the
following expression ∫ v¯
v
u(w + v − b) dF (v)− u(w) = 0. (2)
Thus, the solution does not depend on the bidder’s belief about other bidders’ behavior,
that is, the distribution of the other bidders’ highest bid Gk(·). As a result, a bidder’s
optimal bid b∗ has to be the same in all different auctions in our experiment. Moreover,
b∗ constitutes a dominant strategy (with respect to expected utility) for the bidder in the
four auction formats.14 We formulate the following statement.
Proposition 1 In the setting with uncertain but independent private valuations, an ex-
pected utility maximizing bidder submits the same (maximum) bid in the four different
auction formats of the Treatments A1u–A4u.
For example, a risk neutral bidder, whose utility is given by u(x) = x , bids her expected
valuation b =
∫ v¯
v
v dF (v) .
In the theoretical consideration we neglect the increment of 5 ExCU which is used in
the auctions. By taking it into account, the theoretical considerations in Section 2.2 also
apply for a bidder who computes her optimal bid b∗ according to (1). In A3 and A4,
b∗ determines a bidder’s benchmark, independent of the increment. That is, the bidder
accepts every price below (or equal to) b∗ and quits the auction when the price rises
beyond b∗. The rules of A1 and A2, however, may induce bidders, dependent on the
pricing rule, to deviate (a little bit) from b∗, as described in Section 2.2. On this account,
we also make use of both pricing rules PR1 and PR2 in Treatments A1u and A2u.
Experimental results of Treatments A1u–A4u
Since the two pricing rules PR1 and PR2 lead to similar prices,15 we again take the liberty
of pooling the two samples of Treatment A1u and of Treatment A2u, respectively.
The results of the four treatments show a clear trend (Table 7): the average auction
price increases from treatment to treatment. The overall comparison of the four different
14Note that this result also holds if the bidder updates her belief during the course of a dynamic auction.
If in one of the dynamic auctions k ∈ {A2, A3, A4} the auction price reaches p > bmin with Gk(p) > 0,
a bidder is induced to update her initial belief G(z) to Gp(z), for example Gp(z) = Gk(z | z ≥ p) =
(Gk(z)−Gk(p))/(1−Gk(p)). It is easy to see that an update does not change condition (2). Hence,
a bidder’s optimal bid b∗ does not depend on the price level p at which b∗ is calculated. Note that
this property immediately follows from the fact that b∗ is a dominant strategy.
15Pairwise comparison of the results under the PR1- and the PR2-groups in Treatment A1u and in
Treatment A2u by means of the U -test:
Treatment A1u: sample sizes: 6, 6; average prices: 611.67, 604.17; test statistics: 38.5; p-value > 0.5.
Treatment A2u: sample sizes: 6, 6; average prices: 627.50, 618.33; test statistics: 15; p-value > 0.3.
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Table 7: Average auction prices (in ExCU)
Treatment A1u A2u A3u A4u
Average price 607.92 620.83 630.83 652.92
Median price 615 620 630 645
auction formats by means of the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test reveals significant dif-
ferences between the four treatments and the additionally computed Jonckheere-Terpstra
test supports the auction fever hypotheses that the auction prices rise significantly from
Treatment A1u up to A4u.16
A closer look at the ranked prices of all groups, which are listed in Table 13 in Appendix
A, supports this result. For example, four of the five highest prices belong to Treatment
A4u. The highest price A2u-group is ranked on the sixth position and the highest price
A1u-group on the 13th position. On the other hand, seven of the ten lowest prices belong
to the Treatments A1u and A2u. The impact of the auction format also becomes evident
by comparing the auction prices with a reference price. For comparability, we choose
the two “risk-neutral prices” 615 and 620, which mark the theoretic prediction in the
certainty setting in Section 2.2. Table 8 provides further evidence: while in Treatment
A1u five auctions end below and four above the risk-neutral prediction, in Treatment A4u
the relation is zero to ten.
Table 8: Deviation of the auction price from the “risk neutral price”
< = > Sum
Treatment A1u 5 (41.7%) 3 (25.0%) 4 (33.3%) 12
A2u 3 (25.0%) 4 (33.3%) 5 (41.7%) 12
A3u 3 (25.0%) 2 (16.7%) 7 (41.7%) 12
A4u 0 (0%) 2 (16.7%) 10 (83.3%) 12
Sum 11 (29.1%) 11 (29.1%) 26 (60.4%) 48
Remember, most of the auctions in the certainty setting are won by bidder B3, as
theoretically predicted. The results in the uncertainty setting do not show such a clear
picture (see Table 14 in Appendix A). Note that (only) 54.2% of the auctions are won
by bidders of type B3. Although this share increases from 41.7% (A1u) up to 66.7%
(A4u), the χ2-test does not reveal significant differences in the distribution of the winning
bidders between the four treatments.17 Moreover, it is worthwhile to mention that we do
not observe “irrational” bidding at all in the sense that subjects bid more than the upper
bound of the distribution of their valuation.
Result 2 The auction prices increase significantly in the uncertainty setting from A1u
up to A4u. We attribute this to auction fever induced by the dynamics of the auctions
16Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks: test statistics: 11.577; p-value < 0.001.
Jonckheere-Terpstra test (e.g., Hollander & Wolfe, 1973): test statistics: 615; asymptotic normally
distributed test statistics: 3.32; p-value < 0.001.
17χ2-test: degree of freedom: 6; test statistics: 9.20; p-value > 0.1.
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and the appearance of the pseudo-endowment effect and the source-dependence effect in
the dynamic auctions.
Note that in the dynamic auctions not all subjects are captured by auction fever. In
the auctions of A2u, we observe only five (of 36) subjects who bid above their expected
valuation (i.e., they bid more than the next price step). This number increases in the
auction of A3u up to ten subjects and in the auction of A4u up to 14 subjects. Notably,
in the auctions of A2u, almost one third of the subjects (eleven subjects) end the auction
on the price step right before or right their after expected valuation, what we denote as
bidding in line with the expected valuation, while we observe only five of these in the
auctions of A3u.
Let us additionally compare the results of the uncertainty treatments with their cer-
tainty counterpart.18 Under format A1 we observe a higher average auction price in A1c
than in A1u (617.08 vs. 607.92). Although this difference is not significant, it can be
seen as in line with the hypothesis of risk-averse decision makers, which predicts higher
auction prices under certainty than under uncertainty (in the expected utility approach,
presented in Section 2.3, if the expected valuations and the certain valuations are equal).
Auction format A2 induces almost the same average result to A2c and A2u (620.42 vs.
620.83). It seems that here auction fever compensates risk aversion, while the significant
difference between A4c and A4u (621.25 vs. 652.92) speaks for a dominance of auction
fever over risk aversion in the English auction A4.
In the following (Section 3), however, we move away from the expected utility ap-
proach and its concept of risk aversion towards an extended prospect theory framework
including the concept of loss aversion. In this framework, we present a theoretical model
which describes auction fever as a consequence of the pseudo-endowment effect and the
attachment effect, which we consider as more appropriate for capturing the phenomenon
of auction fever. However, before we feel qualified for developing and presenting this
approach, we additionally investigate the impact of the real endowment effect on bidding
behavior within our experimental framework.
2.4 Capturing the WTA reference point by a procurement
auction
The endowment effect is associated with the well-known difference between the willingness
to accept (WTA) and the willingness to pay (WTP) for the same item. For this purpose,
we additionally design an experimental procurement auction in which the subjects have
the possibility to sell an item (a ship), which they possess at the beginning of the auction.
Remember, we assume that the course of a dynamic sales auction induces the pseudo-
endowment effect (i.e., a person acts as if she would own the item although she does not).
Therefore, in our setting a person’s intrinsic WTP can only be measured in the one-shot
auctions of Treatment A1u. Hence, we design its procurement counterpart, where subjects
can sell an item in an auction, in order to record their WTA.
In this treatment, which is denoted by P1u, we run a procurement auction whose design
is similar the sales auction in Treatment A1u. Participants are asked to submit their lower
18Pairwise comparison of the results of the certainty and uncertainty treatments by means of the U -test:
A1c and A1u: sample sizes: 12, 12; average prices: 617.92, 607.08; test statistics: 65.5; p-value: > 0.2.
A2c and A2u: sample sizes: 12, 12; average prices: 620.42, 620.83; test statistics: 61.5; p-value: > 0.2.
A4c and A4u: sample sizes: 12, 12; average prices: 621.25, 652.92; test statistics: 20.5; p-value: < 0.01.
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bidding limit once. A bidding mechanism then outbids the bids against each other starting
from a high price and decreasing it by a constant decrement of 5 ExCU. Bidders face a
second-price procurement auction in which the bidder with the lowest bid sells her item
and is paid the second lowest bid.19
Treatment P1u consists of twelve groups of three bidders, who have private but incom-
plete information of their valuation for a hypothetical good. Right after the auction ends,
the individual values realize. The distributions of subjects’ valuations, presented in Table
9, differ in the position of the intervals from those used in A1u for several reasons.20
Table 9: Bidders’ private information about their individual valuations in Treatment P1u
Bidder Valuation Interval Expected Valuation
B1 [112, 312] 212
B2 [117, 317] 217
B3 [122, 322] 222
At the end of the auction the winner sells his good at the price determined by the
auction and the other bidders’ valuations are drawn from their individual distributions.
As the bidders are endowed with the good there is no additional lump-sum payment.
Table 10: Deviation of the individual bids b from E[V ] of all 36 bidders of A1u and of
P1u and the twelve decisive bidders of A1u–A4u and of P1u
Treat- Number of Number of Number of Mean Median
ment observations b < E[V ] b > E[V ] deviation deviation
A1u 36 20 16 -17.56 -14.5
P1u 36 12 24 20.78 15.5
A1u 12 7 5 -22.00 -24.5
A2u 12 7 5 -8.25 -2
A3u 12 7 5 -4.92 -2
A4u 12 4 8 24.67 13
P1u 12 3 9 18.41 18
The results of the twelve groups are listed in Table 15 in Appendix A. Here, we compare
the prices of P1u with those of Treatment A1u. For this purpose, we compute for each
19Since we did not find any differences between the groups under pricing rules PR1 and those under
PR2 in the sales auctions (see Section 2.1), we decided to exclusively implement the second price rule
(PR1) in Treatment P1u, because it is “theoretically neater” than rule PR2.
20Please note that we designed Treatment P1u after conducting and analyzing the Au-Treatments. There-
fore, we had to find a compromise in designing the valuation intervals. We decided on the valuations
in Table 9 because we wanted to avoid a negative lump-sum payment which would have been nec-
essary if we had used the intervals of the Au-Treatments (Table 6). Moreover, since we conduct a
simultaneous one-shot auction only, we need not care about the differences between the valuations.
For these reasons, we decided on the three intervals in Table 9 whose expected values are different
but close together.
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bidder the deviation of the individual bid b from her expected value of the item E[V ] (see
first and second row of Table 10). By applying the U -test, the hypothesis of an equal
deviation of the bids from E[V ] in A1u and P1u is rejected.21 The observation of this
clear difference leads to the following result.
Result 3 WTP versus WTA: Subjects’ average deviation of their bid from their ex-
pected valuation significantly differs between A1u and P1u. In the sales auctions of A1u
subjects tend to bid below their expected valuation, while in the procurement auctions of
P1u they predominantly submit bids above their expected valuation, that is, WTP < WTA.
Let us additionally have a look at the deviations of the individual bids from the ex-
pected values of all uncertainty treatments A1u–A4u and P1u. Since in Treatment A4u
we can only observe the dropout price of the twelve decisive bidders (i.e., the bidders who
determine the auction price), we restrict this comparison to these bidders, whose devia-
tions are shown in the lower part of Table 10. Here, we again observe a clear trend: the
average and median deviation increases from a negative value in A1u up to the positive
values of A4u. Note that the average deviation in A4u is larger than in P1u, while it is
the other way around for the median deviation. Moreover, while in A1u, A2u, and A3u
only five of twelve decisive bidders exceed their expected valuations with their bid, eight
decisive bidders in A4u and nine in P1u do so. With regard to WTP/WTA considerations,
we apparently observe a continuous increase in bidders’ WTP from A1u up to A4u where
it reaches the WTA level of the bidders in P1u. These observations provide the basis for
the theoretical model in the next section, which attributes the increase in the bidders’
WTP to a change in their reference point caused by the course of a dynamic auction.
3 Modeling auction fever
In this section we present an extension of reference-dependent utility theories, as developed
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Sugden (2003), and Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007),
as an alternative theoretical basis for describing bidding behavior in auctions.22 Although
different effects are suspected of being involved in provoking auction fever, we focus on
the pseudo-endowment effect and the attachment effect, which is a special case of the
former in our approach. These effects, which are considered of particular strength, base
on the assumption, that the course of a dynamic auction shifts a bidder’s reference point,
and thus changes her win-loss reference position, which is crucial for a loss-averse bidder
when deciding on her bid.
3.1 Reference-dependent utility theory
Let Ω ⊂ R denote a set of consequences. Two consequences x, y ∈ Ω are compared by an
individual according to the “gain-loss utility” u(y, x), which is given by
u(y, x) = ϕ(c(y)− c(x)) , (3)
21A1u and P1u: sample sizes: 36, 36; average (median) deviations: -17.56 (-14.5), 20.78 (15.5); test
statistics: 376; asymptotic normally distributed test statistics: 3.07; p-value: 0.001.
22Another example where a a model with reference-dependent preferences is used, is the work of Compte
and Jehiel (2003), who apply it to bargaining situations.
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with ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(·) being differentiable and strictly increasing. The function c(·)
represents individual’s “choiceless” or “consumption utility” and is assumed to be differ-
entiable and strictly increasing (e.g., Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Ko˝szegi & Rabin, 2006).
The function ϕ(·) describes a person’s change in utility if the person changes from the
riskless “reference consumption level” x to the riskless consumption of y. In the following,
we consider the loss-averse and reference-dependent representation of ϕ(·) proposed by
Sugden (2003), where ϕ(·) is assumed to be strict zero-point concave, that is, for all r,
r′ ∈ R and r′ < 0 < r it is ϕ(r′)/r′ > ϕ(r)/r. Note that this representation also includes
functions with the property ϕ(r) < −ϕ(−r) for all r > 0 , which corresponds to Kah-
neman and Tversky’s value function. Each strictly concave function ϕ(·), for example,
satisfies strict zero-point concavity; the converse, however, is not true.
There exists a set of (objective) positions that a person can take, where each position
is uniquely described by a lottery. The set of lotteries is denoted by Θ, where each
lottery is determined by a probability measure over the set Ω of consequences. Consider
a person who is in a certain position, which is called her reference position R ∈ Θ, and
who faces the decision either to change from R to position X ∈ Θ or to position Y ∈ Θ.
Here, we make use of the model of a triadic preference relation, which is assumed to be
associated with a unique subjective expected utility representation (e.g., Sugden, 2003):
weak reference-dependent preference is represented by
Y % X |R ⇔ E[u(Y,R)− u(X,R)] ≥ 0 , (4)
where the stochastic expectation applies to the joint probability distribution of the three
lotteries X, Y , R ∈ Θ. Strict preference  and indifference ∼ are represented analogously.
That is, the person strictly prefers Y to X, given the reference position R (Y  X |R), if
and only if Y leads to a higher increase in the person’s expected utility than X, viewed
from the individual reference point R. Remember, not only the two alternative states X
and Y may be associated with stochastic outcomes but also the reference point R.
3.2 Extension to a model with subjective reference points
We now extend this model by allowing the reference position also to be subjective and
not to be associated with a unique lottery, like the objective opportunity positions. We
suggest this extension because what exactly serves as a reference point usually can not
be unambiguously defined (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1999).
Our model particularly applies to a decision problem with two alternative positions X
and Y , where a person is physically (objectively) in position X and faces the opportunity
to change to position Y . This, for example, describes a bidder’s situation in an English
auction when at certain price level she has to decide whether to bid and stay in the race,
or not to bid and run the risk of losing the item.
As Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and others, we make the somewhat extreme assumption
that the person’s probabilistic beliefs about the outcomes, given by the distributions of
X and Y , are determined by the person’s expectations before the decision and do not
change during the decision process, e.g., in the course of an auction.23
23That is, we assume that during the course of an auction a bidder does not learn anything that changes
her beliefs (i.e., reduces her uncertainty) about her valuation of the item. This approach differs from
Rasmusen (2006), who assumes that uncertainty about private values in an auction is due to not
having learned something that can be learned during the auction.
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The extension bases on the idea that during the decision process the person – although
(objectively) being in X – is psychologically attracted by position Y and (subjectively)
imagines being in Y to a more or less large extent. Think of a bidder in a English
auction who starts in position X, characterized by “no contact” with the item Y at the
beginning of the auction. Then, during the course of the auction, the bidder adopts the
position of the current high bidder, which subjectively brings her closer to the item Y .
If she is outbidden thereafter, the high bidder experience may induce her to defend this
position in order to reserve the loss of Y . In their challenging paper, Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2006) provide another illustrative example of a consumer who intends to buy a pair of
shoes, while her willingness to pay positively depends on the probability with which she
expects to buy the shoes. As mentioned before, this effect is called “attachment effect.”
The consumer starts from X, that is, no contact with the shoes, and comes closer to
them by thinking about owing and using them. Since their actual value for the consumer
presumably arises not until they are used, their value at the time of the purchase decision
is modeled by a random variable Y .
These considerations lead us to an approach, in which we allow the person to look at the
decision problem from two different angles: from where she actually is (X) and from where
she wants to get to (Y ). Hence, she compares X and Y not only from the X-perspective
but also from the Y -perspective, that is, beside considering the “actual” question of
moving from X to Y , the person also takes the approach of giving up Y and “returning”
to X into account. In the next step, she deliberates about both perspectives by putting
weight on the two different questions, in dependence of her subjective “nearness” to Y , and
combines them in one decision problem. For this purpose, we model a person’s reference
position as a weighted combination of two the alternative positions X and Y and call it
the person’s subjective reference position, in which she finds herself during the decision
process. Formally, the subjective reference position is described by
R(λ) = ((1− λ)X,λY ) , (5)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the person’s “degree of nearness” to position Y . For the individual
calculus, we extend the reference-dependent preference representation (4) by combining
the two questions of (i) acquiring Y and (ii) of giving up Y in one calculus:
Y % X |R(λ) ⇔ E [(1− λ)(u(Y,X)− u(X,X)) + λ(u(Y, Y )− u(X, Y ))] ≥ 0
⇔ (1− λ)E [(u(Y,X)− u(X,X))] + λE [(u(Y, Y )− u(X, Y ))] ≥ 0
⇔ (1− λ)E[u(Y,X)]− λE[u(X, Y )] ≥ 0 . (6)
Strict preference  and indifference ∼ are described analogously.24 For λ = 0 or λ = 1
the person’s reference position is X or Y , respectively. For λ ∈ (0, 1) the person “feels”
betweenX and Y . The more the person considers herself as possessing Y , the more weight
λ she shifts her focus from acquiring Y to not giving up or defending Y . This calculus is
appositely reflected by the last line of (6), where E[u(Y,X)] expresses the expected gain
of changing from X to Y and −E[u(X, Y )] the expected loss of giving up Y . If a person
feels closely connected to Y , she adds a high weight to the latter, otherwise she mainly
takes the gain of changing from X to Y into account.
24Note that this approach can easily be extended to three objective positions, an objective reference
position (i.e., the position in which the person physically is at the time of her decision) and two
alternative positions, which the person can reach from her objective reference position.
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Note that a person, who is in such a pre-decision position where she notionally includes
different options, will definitively leave this subjective position after the decision, since an
active decision is assumed to be related to objective options only. Thus, the person will
definitively change from her subjective reference position R(λ) to one of the two objective
positions X or Y , whatever she decides upon. By interpreting λ as the person’s subjective
probability of acquiring Y , this approach also allows to model the idea of Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006).
Consider the case where the alternative position Y consists of a lottery Z ∈ Θ and the
person has to pay price p for adopting Z, that is, Y ≡ Z − p. In this case, the person’s
subjective reference position also depends on p and hence is denoted by
R(λ, p) = ((1− λ)X,λ(Z − p))
for λ ∈ [0, 1]. We now focus on the relationship of the person’s willingness to pay (WTP)
for adopting position Z (i.e., possessing Z) and her subjective reference position. Her
WTP for Z, denoted by p¯, is then defined as follows.
Definition 1 The willingness to pay (WTP) p¯ for a lottery Z of a person, whose prefer-
ences are characterized by %, is given by
Z − p¯ ∼ X |R(λ, p¯)
Z − p  X |R(λ, p) for p < p¯
Z − p ≺ X |R(λ, p) for p > p¯ .
We state the following result for our model.
Proposition 2 (Pseudo-endowment effect) A loss-averse person’s WTP for lottery
Z exists, is unique, and depends positively on λ.
The proof is presented in Appendix B. That is, the stronger the “degree of nearness” to
Y (measured by λ) in the subjective reference position is, the more the person is willing
to pay for achieving Y . This effect we refer to as the pseudo-endowment effect. “Pseudo”
because the person, when facing the decision problem, is physically not in position Y (i.e.,
does not possess Y ), but perceives herself as almost so.
As mentioned before, by interpreting λ as the person’s subjective probability with which
she expects to acquire Y , the pseudo-endowment effect also includes the attachment effect,
that is, the higher the subjective probability is, the more is the person willing to pay for
Y .
3.3 Reference-dependent preferences and bidding
Let us now consider dynamic auctions in more detail. In an English auction, for example,
at a certain price level p, a person has to decide whether to bid or not to bid. In this
situation, while feeling torn about the wish of possessing the item and the leave-taking
of the item, the person has two options: by raising her hand the bidder seizes the chance
to become high bidder, while by not raising her hand she runs the risk of losing the
item. Here, the triadic reference relation seems to be an appropriate approach, taking a
reference position and two alternatives into account.
A bidder’s position before the auction begins is given by X , where the bidder only
considers her WTP for the item from the point of view of not possessing it. The position
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of possessing the item is associated with lottery Z, to which a person comes closer in the
course of the auction by bidding and adopting the current high bidder position.25 Then,
owning the item Z is only one step away. In our approach, a person’s subjective reference
position R(λ, p) at price p lies between X and Z − p, where the “degree of nearness” to
the item is reflected by the magnitude of λ in (5), which is assumed to depend on the
history of the auction, particularly on its length and a bidder’s “intensity of contact” with
the item, caused by the experience of the high bidder position, e.g., how long the auction
already lasts and how many times the person was current high bidder in the course of the
auction. Proposition 2 states that a bidder’s WTP positively depends on λ, that is, the
stronger the “degree of nearness” to the high bidder position or the item is, the more a
loss-averse bidder is willing to pay and thus to bid for the item.26
According to the previous section the pseudo-endowment effect is caused by a bidder’s
imagination of already possessing the item. Therefore, a bidder’s subjective reference
position includes the case of possessing the item, although by bidding she can only achieve
the position of the current high bidder for sure. Hence, there is a difference between the
subjective reference position and the position a bidder can adopt. We take this case into
account and extend our model by distinguishing between the current high bidder position
at price p, denoted by Y (p), and the position of owning the item and paying p, denoted
by Z − p, which is achieved if the bidder is not outbidden after becoming current high
bidder. For this purpose, we model the lottery of the current high bidder position as
Y (p) = Q(p)(Z − p) + (1−Q(p))X,
where
Q(p) =
 1 : q(p) ∈ [0, 1]0 : 1− q(p)
describes the Bernoulli random variable of winning the auction at price p, that is, q(p) is
the bidder’s subjective probability of not being outbidden after acquiring the high bidder
position at price p. By assuming stochastic independence of Q(p) and Z as well as of
Q(p) and X, the equivalence
Y (p) % X |R(λ, p) ⇔ Z − p % X |R(λ, p)
25Note that X describes a bidder’s reference position in the one-shot auction A1u, while her reference
position in the one-shot procurement auction P1u is given by Z.
26Consequently, in our one-shot auctions A1u and P1u bidders are characterized by λ = 0 and λ = 1,
respectively. We additionally use the data of these two treatments for estimating the degree of loss
aversion. For this purpose we apply the popular utility function
ϕ(x) =
 xα : x ≥ 0−β(−x)α : x < 0 .
Since in experiments gains are small, we set α = 1 in accordance with other researchers (e.g., Blondel,
2002). When the item’s value V is uniformly distributed over [v, v¯], we derive from condition (6) with
λ = 0 the representative bid b(A1u) for A1u and with λ = 1 the representative bid b(P1u) for P1u as
b(A1u) = E[V ]−
√
β − 1√
β + 1
∆ and b(P1u) = E[V ] +
√
β − 1√
β + 1
∆
with E[V ] = (v+ v¯)/2 and ∆ = (v¯− v)/2. Applying the method of nonlinear least square regression,
the estimator for beta yields approximately 2 for both treatments (1.94 and 1.98), which is in line
with other investigations (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Bateman, Kahneman, Munro, Starmer,
& Sugden, 2005).
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holds for every price level p .27 Therefore, Proposition 2 also applies to the case that a
bidder’s subjective reference position R(λ, p) includes the imagination of possessing the
item Z − p although she can only achieve the current high bidder position Y (p) for sure.
Note that the attachment effect corresponds to the case λ(·) ≡ q(·), where λ(p) is given
by the person’s subjective probability with which she expects to acquire Z at price p.
Let us now consider a dynamic auction with bidding stages t = 1, 2, . . ., in which
the price pt increases stepwise, that is, pt+1 > pt. The set of n bidders is denoted by
N = {1, . . . , n}. At every stage t, a bidder’s information of the preceding course of the
auction is described by the auction history h(t) = (h1, . . . , ht−1) with h(1) = ∅. Hence,
bidders’ information of stage t is given by the component ht, whose information content
depends on the type of auction. In the Japanese auction A2, for example, the only useful
information for a bidder is given by the price, that is, ht = pt.
The bidders are characterized by individual reference-dependent preferences (6), where
a bidder’s individual “nearness” parameter is assumed to be uniquely determined by the
history of the auction, that is, every history h(t) determines an specific value λi(h(t)) ∈
[0, 1] for each bidder i ∈ N . It is additionally assumed that λi(h(1)) = 0, that is, the
pseudo-endowment occurs in the course of the auction and not at its very beginning.28
Then, in the course of the auction, the value of λi can change. This change, however, is
assumed to be unexpected and not controllable for the bidders; it simply happens. At a
certain stage, a bidder does not know her future values of λi and, thus, is not aware of
future situations, that is, these are beyond her calculation.29 On this presupposition, we
suggest to consider a simple strategy.
Definition 2 A bidding strategy in a dynamic auction is called myopic bidding strategy,
if at every stage t, a bidder decides on bidding at price pt only according to
Y (pt) % X |R(λi(h(t)), pt) . (7)
Thereto, we propose the following solution concept.
Definition 3 A constellation of myopic bidding strategies is called a myopic bidding equi-
librium, if on every stage t, none of the bidders, who are still in the auction, has an
incentive to deviate from her myopic bidding strategy (according to 7).
It is obvious that the myopic bidding strategy forms such an equilibrium in our considered
types of dynamic auctions, since it constitutes a bidder’s “stage-wise” best reply to all
possible bidding strategies of the other bidders.
Let us now consider the dynamic auctions more precisely. In the Japanese auction A2,
the myopic bidding strategy induces bidders, who are still in the auction on stage t, to
27According to (6), we get
Y (p) % X |R(λ, p) ⇔ E [(1− λ)(u(Y (p), X)− u(X,X)) + λ(u(Y (p), Z − p)− u(X,Z − p))] ≥ 0
⇔ (1− λ)E[q(p) · u(Z − p,X)]− λE[q(p) · u(X,Z − p)] ≥ 0
⇔ (1− λ)E[u(Z − p,X)]− λE[u(X,Z − p)] ≥ 0 ⇔ Z − p % X |R(λ, p) .
28One can additionally assume that λi(·) is non-decreasing in history, that is, for every history h(t) and an
arbitrary continuation ht+1, which together lead to h(t+1) = (h(t), ht+1) , it is λi(h(t+1)) ≥ λi(h(t)).
This is particularly plausible for the case λ(h(t)) = q(pt), that is, a bidder’s subjective probability of
winning the auction increases with the auction price.
29This is in contrast to the assumption in the model of Dodonova and Khoroshilov (2004).
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decide whether to accept pt and stay in the auction or to leave the auction. Note that
the history in a Japanese auction, denoted by hJ(t), consists of a sequence of prices only,
hJ(t) = (p1, . . . , pt−1), which then uniquely determines λi(hJ(t)) on stage t. Hence, if
the bidders apply the myopic bidding strategy, the price path uniquely determines each
bidder’s exit price and, thus, a unique myopic bidding equilibrium.
In the English auction A4 things are more complex. The stages where a bidder was
current high bidder has also to be included in the history hE(t), what allows us to model
the impact of being current high bidder on λi, which we consider of paramount importance.
For simplicity, let us assume that on every stage the current high bidder is identifiable for
all bidders. Hence, the history is the same for all bidders and its components are given
by ht = (pt, it), where it ∈ N denotes the current high bidder at price pt.
We have already addressed several possible impact factors on a person’s willingness
to bid which depend on her experience in the history of an auction. According to our
experimental results, we assign a bid increasing effect to the following factors: the award
of the current high bidder position, achieving this position on her own, and being exclusive
high bidder. Our experimental design, however, does not allow to directly estimate the
quantitative effect of these factors. For this purpose and for the sake of simplicity, let us
restrict the impact of a person’s high bidder experience to the number of times the person
was current high bidder. Hence, with ni(hE(t)) we denote the number of stages in the
history of an English auction hE(t) where bidder i was current high bidder, ni(hE(t)) ≥ 0
for all t and ni(∅) = 0. According to our hypothesis of the pseudo-endowment effect, we
consider the number of times a bidder was current high bidder as relevant for λi .
Assumption 1 Given an English auction at stage t. For two histories hE(t) and h
′
E(t),
which both include the same price sequence {pt} it is: λi(hE(t)) = λi(h′E(t)) if ni(hE(t)) =
ni(h
′
E(t)) and λi(hE(t)) ≥ λi(h′E(t)) if ni(hE(t)) > ni(h′E(t)).
Thus, the evolution of λi depends on the actual course of an English auction, in which
bidders outbid each other. Since this usually does not follow a predetermined plan and
allows different sequences of current high bidders, the bidders’ λ-values and thus their
decisions are not ex ante predictable, even if we exactly know their λ-functions. However,
in our approach, every history determines a unique λi-sequence for each bidder i and thus
a unique combination of myopic bidding strategies, which together form a myopic bidding
equilibrium. Note that these considerations also apply to our auction format A3.
For the comparison of an English and a Japanese auction, we assume that a bidder’s
evolution of λi in the Japanese auction is equal to the evolution in the English auction if
bidder i has never adopted the current high bidder position in the past.
Assumption 2 Given an English auction and a Japanese auction with the same price
sequence {pt}. For every stage t it is: λi(hJ(t)) = λi(hE(t)) if ni(hE(t)) = 0 and
λi(hJ(t)) ≤ λi(hE(t)) if ni(hE(t)) > 0.
As a consequence, the final price (auctioneer’s revenue) in the English auction and auction
A3 is greater or equal than the final price in the Japanese auction.
Moreover, in the English auction, a bidder decides according to (7) whether to bid at
price pt or not. Contrary to the Japanese auction A2 and auction A3, the latter decision
does not mean that the bidder has to quit the auction. This allows a situation to occur
in the English auction but not in its Japanese counterpart and in auction A3. That is,
on stage t rule (7) decides against bidding, while it decides in favor of bidding on a later
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stage, since the value of λi has increased in the course of the auction. This difference
additionally speaks for higher prices in the English auction than in the Japanese auction
(and auction A3).
Finally, note that the one-shot second price auction A1 is captured by λi(∅) = 0 for all
i ∈ N . Here, a bidder’s corresponding WTP (Proposition 2) determines her equilibrium
bid as a dominant strategy. The following statement summarizes our considerations (in-
cluding Assumption 1 and 2) with respect to auctioneer’s revenue in the (myopic bidding)
equilibrium of the second price auction piA1, the Japanese auction piA2, auction A3 piA3,
and the English auction piA4 which are in line with our experimental results of the IPV
treatments with uncertain private valuations (Section 2.3).
Proposition 3 For a given set of loss-averse bidders N and an identical price sequence
in the dynamic auctions A2, A3, and A4, auctioneer’s revenue is ranked as follows:
piA4 ≥ piA3 ≥ piA2 ≥ piA1 .
4 Conclusion
The results of our experiment support the view that auction fever occurs in an environment
with private but uncertain valuations. Nevertheless, not all bidders are prone to auction
fever. The effect is due to some of the bidders that determine the prices.
From our results we conclude that auction dynamics lead to higher bids, that is,
multiple-stage and multiple-bid processes result in higher prices than static auctions in
which bidders are only allowed to submit one bid or a bidding limit. Furthermore, we
observe even higher bids in dynamic auctions when we allow for the pseudo-endowment
effect. Particularly in the case that bidders have influence on becoming the high bidder
(Treatment A4u), the source-dependence effect appears to be crucial.
All those effects do not occur in an experiment with certain private valuations. We
introduce a model with uncertain private valuations and argue that it might be more
realistic. We used this model in our experiment to retain better control of bidders’ valu-
ations compared to auctioning real items.
In addition we present a theoretical model with reference-dependent preferences und
subjective reference points. The results that we deduce from that model reproduce our
hypotheses on auction fever, that is, the expected ranking of auctioneer’s revenues or
prices. A next step might be to extend the model by including some more of the effects
that are supposed to evoke auction fever besides the pseudo-endowment effect.
Note that in our model the bidder’s that are prone to auction fever feel no regret after
winning the item. This is in line with a hypothesis of Ku et al. (2005) which is supported
by their data. In our model, from the ex-post point of view the pseudo-endowment effect
does not lead to overbidding, but maybe to bidding at the upper bound of a valuation
interval. Underestimating the value of owning the item ex-ante would be explained by
naming a value at the lower limit of the interval when the bidder does not yet have the
experience of feeling close to the item.
The results should be valuable especially for auctioneers that are interested in raising
their revenue. We advise bidders in a dynamic auction to be aware of the possible change
in their willingness-to-pay before deciding to participate and to develop a bidding strategy
taking this into account. On the other hand, it might happen that in a sealed bid auction
a bidder starts thinking about owning the item only after she submitted her bid and she
might realize that she has bid too low when it is too late to raise the bid.
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Appendix
A Ranked auction results of all groups
Table 11: Ranked auction results of all groups in the certainty treatments A1c, A2c, A4c
Rank Price [ExCU] Treatment Group number Winning bidder
1 655 A2c 1 B1
655 A4c 11 B1
3 650 A1c 7 B2
650 A2c 12 B1
5 625 A1c 2 B3
625 A4c 4 B3
7 620 A1c 3 B1
620 A1c 1 B3
620 A1c 5 B3
620 A2c 3 B3
620 A2c 6 B3
620 A4c 1 B3
620 A4c 2 B3
620 A4c 3 B3
620 A4c 5 B3
620 A4c 9 B3
17 615 A1c 6 B3
615 A1c 9 B3
615 A1c 10 B3
615 A2c 4 B3
615 A2c 5 B3
615 A2c 9 B3
615 A2c 10 B3
615 A4c 6 B3
615 A4c 7 B3
615 A4c 8 B3
615 A4c 10 B3
615 A4c 12 B3
29 610 A1c 8 B2
610 A1c 4 B3
610 A1c 11 B3
610 A2c 2 B1
610 A2c 7 B3
610 A2c 8 B3
610 A2c 11 B3
36 595 A1c 12 B1
Table 12: Distribution of winning bidders in the certainty treatments A1c, A2c, A4c
B1 B2 B3 Sum
Treatment A1c 2 (16.7%) 2 (16.7%) 8 (66.7%) 12
A2c 3 (25.0%) 0 (0%) 9 (75.0%) 12
A4c 1 (8.3%) 0 (0%) 11 (91.7%) 12
Sum 6 (16.7%) 2 (5.6%) 28 (77.8%) 36
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Table 13: Ranked auction results of all groups in the uncertainty treatments A1u–A4u
Rank Price [ExCU] Treatment Group number Winning bidder
1 710 A4u 4 B3
2 700 A4u 10 B3
3 695 A3u 4 B2
4 690 A4u 1 B3
5 670 A4u 6 B1
6 660 A2u 1 B2
660 A3u 10 B3
8 655 A3u 1 B1
9 655 A4u 9 B2
10 650 A2u 12 B3
650 A3u 7 B3
650 A4u 11 B3
13 640 A1u 11 B2
640 A2u 5 B2
640 A4u 5 B2
16 635 A2u 8 B3
635 A3u 5 B3
635 A4u 7 B3
19 630 A3u 11 B3
630 A3u 12 B2
21 625 A1u 5 B3
625 A1u 6 B3
625 A1u 9 B3
625 A2u 3 B3
625 A4u 3 B3
625 A4u 12 B3
27 620 A1u 10 B1
620 A2u 2 B3
620 A2u 9 B3
620 A3u 2 B3
620 A3u 3 B2
620 A4u 8 B2
33 615 A1u 4 B1
615 A1u 8 B1
615 A2u 4 B2
615 A2u 10 B3
615 A4u 2 B3
38 610 A1u 1 B2
39 605 A1u 3 B1
605 A2u 6 B3
605 A2u 7 B2
42 600 A3u 9 B3
43 590 A1u 2 B3
590 A3u 8 B1
45 585 A3u 6 B2
46 575 A1u 7 B3
47 560 A2u 11 B2
48 550 A1u 12 B1
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Table 14: Distribution of winning bidders in the uncertainty treatments A1u–A4u
B1 B2 B3 Sum
Treatment A1u 5 (41.7%) 2 (16.7%) 5 (41.7%) 12
A2u 0 (0.0%) 5 (41.7%) 7 (58.3%) 12
A3u 2 (16.7%) 4 (33.3%) 6 (50.0%) 12
A4u 1 (8.3%) 3 (25.0%) 8 (66.7%) 12
Sum 8 (16.7%) 14 (29.2%) 26 (54.2%) 48
Table 15: Ranked auction results of all groups in the uncertainty treatment P1u
Rank Price [ExCU] Group number Winning bidder
1 285 2 B1
2 275 6 B2
3 255 9 B2
4 250 12 B1
5 240 11 B1
6 235 1 B3
7 225 7 B1
225 10 B2
9 220 5 B3
10 210 3 B2
11 200 4 B3
200 8 B1
B Theoretical addenda
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2
By introducing the function
U(λ, p) = (1− λ)E[u(Z − p,X)]− λE[u(X,Z − p)] , (8)
condition (6) can be written as
Z − p % (-) X |R(λ, p) ⇔ U(λ, p) ≥ (≤) 0 .
According to (3), the expected gain-loss utilities with regard to the random variables X
and Z are given by
E[u(Z − p,X)] = E[ϕ(c(Z − p)− c(X))] and
E[u(X,Z − p)] = E[ϕ(c(X)− c(Z − p))] ,
and their derivatives with respect to p by
∂E[u(Z − p,X)]
∂p
= −E[ϕ′(c(Z − p)− c(X)) · c′(Z − p)] < 0 and
∂E[u(X,Z − p)]
∂p
= E[ϕ′(c(X)− c(Z − p)) · c′(Z − p)] > 0 ,
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because ϕ(·) and c(·) are strictly increasing functions. Thus, the derivative of (8) with
respect to p is given by
∂U(λ, p)
∂p
= (1− λ)∂E[u(Z − p,X)]
∂p
− λ∂E[u(X,Z − p)]
∂p
< 0 (9)
and the derivative with respect to λ by
∂U(λ, p)
∂λ
= −E[u(Z − p,X)]− E[u(X,Z − p)] . (10)
A person’s WTP p¯ for adopting Z as described in Definition 1 implies
U(λ, p¯) = 0 (11)
and
U(λ, p)
{
> 0 for p < p¯
< 0 for p > p¯ .
(12)
Due to (8), condition (11) can only be fulfilled for λ ∈ (0, 1) if either
E[u(Z − p¯, X)] > 0 and E[u(X,Z − p¯)] > 0 , (13)
or
E[u(Z − p¯, X)] < 0 and E[u(X,Z − p¯)] < 0 . (14)
Here, we make use of Theorem 3 of Sugden (2003), which states that, if ϕ(·) is strictly
zero-point concave, as assumed, the preferences are strictly exchange-averse, what implies
Z − p % X |X ⇒ Z − p  X |Z − p (15)
and
Z − p - X |Z − p ⇒ Z − p ≺ X |X (16)
for all p . According to (4), (15) is equivalent to
E[u(Z − p,X)− u(X,X)] ≥ 0 ⇒ E[u(Z − p, Z − p)− u(X,Z − p)] > 0
and hence to
E[u(Z − p,X)] ≥ 0 ⇒ E[u(X,Z − p)] < 0 , (17)
and (16) is equivalent to
E[u(Z − p, Z − p)− u(X,Z − p)] ≤ 0 ⇒ E[u(Z − p,X)− u(X,X)] < 0
and hence to
E[u(X,Z − p)] ≥ 0 ⇒ E[u(Z − p,X)] < 0 . (18)
From (13) and (14) combined with (17) and (18) follows that these relationships only allow
for (14), what implies that (10) is strictly positive for λ ∈ (0, 1) . If λ ∈ {0, 1} , either
condition E[u(Z − p¯, X)] = 0 or condition E[u(X,Z − p¯)] = 0 determines p¯ . It follows
from (17) for λ = 0 and from (18) for λ = 1 that in both cases (10) is strictly positive.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the situation where a person is indifferent
between buying and nor buying described by (11), together with (9) we then have
dp¯
dλ
= −
∂U(λ,p¯)
∂λ
∂U(λ,p¯)
∂p
> 0
31
for λ ∈ [0, 1] .
Finally, we have to show that p¯ exists and is unique. Since we restrict our considerations
to non-negative WTP, condition Z % X |X applies, that is, a person, who is in X, prefers
Z to X, if the price for Z is zero. Since this case corresponds to (17) with p = 0, (8)
induces U(λ, p = 0) > 0 for λ ∈ [0, 1] . The strictly negative derivative (9) together with
function ϕ(·)’s property of strict zero-point concavity then implies that there exists a
unique p¯ > 0 that fulfills the conditions (11) and (12), which completes the proof.
C Translation of instructions
Instructions in all treatments consist of two pages each. The instructions for treatments
A1c, A2c, and A4c as well as those for treatments A1u–A4u share a common first page,
respectively. Treatments A1c and A1u, A2c and A2u, as well as A4c and A4u, each
have the same second page, respectively. In treatments A1c, A2c, A1u, and A2u we
distinguished between two pricing rules, such that in these cases we have two variants of
the second page of the instruction. In Treatment P1u we conduct a procurement auction
and, thus, the instruction differs from the other instructions.
C.1 First page of Treatments A1c, A2c, and A4c
Instructions
In the following you are going to participate in an experiment on auctions. At this, you will
make your decisions as bidder isolated from the other participants at your computer terminal.
In the auction you may earn money in cash. How much you will earn depends on your decisions
and on the decisions of the other participants. The monetary units of account in the experiment
are so-called currency units (CU).
Point of Departure
Imagine to be the owner of a ship who offers cruises. That is why you participate in an auction
in that the cruise ship “One World” is auctioned once. Besides you, 2 other bidders participate
in this auction.
In case you purchase the ship by the auction, its value W will turn out by the use in your fleet.
Your value W will be announced to you directly before the auction at your screen.
Please note: the value W is different for every bidder and neither do you know the values of
the other bidders nor do they know your value.
In addition you have a lump-sum payment F of 200 CU at your disposal.
Payoff
1. In case you are awarded the ship for the price P, your profit from the auction G is
calculated with your value W as:
G =W −P
Please note: If you pay more for the ship than it is worth to you, that is, P >W, then
your profit from the auction will be negative, that is, G < 0.
2. In case you are not awarded the ship your profit from the action equals zero, i.e.:
G = 0
The payoff you receive is your lump-sum payment F plus your profit G from the auction, i.e.:
Payoff = F+G
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Your payoff will be converted into Euro and paid cash to you at the end of the experiment,
whereby 1 CU corresponds to 5 Euro Cent. The payment will be individually and anonymously.
C.2 First page of Treatments A1u–A4u
Instructions
In the following you are going to participate in an experiment on auctions. At this, you will
make your decisions as bidder isolated from the other participants at your computer terminal.
In the auction you may earn money in cash. How much you will earn depends on your decisions
and on the decisions of the other participants. The monetary units of account in the experiment
are so-called currency units (CU).
Point of Departure
Imagine to be the owner of a ship who offers cruises. That is why you participate in an auction
in that the cruise ship “One World” is auctioned once. Besides you, 2 other bidders participate
in this auction.
In case you purchase the ship by the auction, its value W will turn out only by the use in your
fleet. However, calculations show that the valueW of the ship for you lies uniformly distributed
betweenW0 andW1. This means, that the ship has at least a value ofW0 and at most a value
of W1 for you, whereby all values (integers) from W0 to W1 have equal probability.
Please note: the boundaries W0 and W1 are different for every bidder. Your individual
boundaries W0 and W1 will be communicated to you directly before the auction on your
screen; the boundaries of the other bidders however are unknown to you.
In addition you have a lump-sum payment F of 200 CU at your disposal.
Payoff
1. In case you are awarded the ship for the price P, the value of the ship for you will
be determined immediately after the auction by drawing a value W out of the uniform
distribution over W0 to W1. Your profit from the auction is then calculated as:
G =W −P
Please note: If you pay more for the ship than it is worth to you, that is, P >W, then
your profit from the auction will be negative, that is, G < 0.
2. In case you are not awarded the ship your profit from the action equals zero, i.e.:
G = 0
The payoff you receive is your lump-sum payment F plus your profit G from the auction, i.e.:
Payoff = F+G
Your payoff will be converted into Euro and paid cash to you at the end of the experiment,
whereby 1 CU corresponds to 5 Euro Cent. The payment will be individually and anonymously.
C.3 Second page of Treatments A1c and A1u, pricing rule 1
Auction
The auction by which the ship is to be sold has the following rules.
You submit exactly once at the beginning of the auction a bid B. Your bid expresses how many
CU you are maximal willing to pay for the ship.
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The minimum bid Bmin for the ship is 500CU. That means that you have to bid at least
500CU, that is, B ≥ Bmin = 500. Thereby bids have to be a multiple of 5CU, that is,
B = 500, 505, 510, 515, 520, . . .
When submitting your bid you do not know the bids of the other bidders nor do they know your
bid.
When all 3 bidders have submitted their bids, the automatical bidding process, which outbids
the bids against each other, starts, and thereby determines the bidder who is awarded the ship.
At this the auction price starts at the minimum bid of Bmin = 500.
The auction price is gradually increased by 5CU at any one time. If a bid is exceeded by the
auction price it quits the auction. The bidding process may end in two ways depending on the
bids:
1. If the highest bid and the second highest bid differ, the bidding process stops when the
auction price exceeds the second highest bid. We denote the remaining highest bid with
B∗ and with P the price at which the bidding process has stopped whereby P equals the
second highest bid plus 5CU. The bidder who submitted the bid B∗ is awarded the ship
and has to pay the price P. In this case P ≤ B∗. That means, that the bidder has to pay
his bid B∗ or less depending on the price P at which the bidding process stops.
2. If at least two bidders have submitted the same bidB∗ which is the highest bid, the bidding
process stops at the price P = B∗. Then one of these bidders is randomly selected to be
awarded the ship at the price P = B∗. In this case the bidder who is awarded the ship
has to pay his bid.
Please note: in this auction you are only allowed to submit a bid once, which may not be
changed afterwards!
Before the auction begins, you are asked some questions on the screen concerning the rules. This
is to assure that all participants have understood the instructions.
C.4 Second page of Treatments A1c and A1u, pricing rule 2
Auction
The auction by which the ship is to be sold has the following rules.
You submit exactly once at the beginning of the auction a bid B. Your bid expresses how many
CU you are maximal willing to pay for the ship.
The minimum bid Bmin for the ship is 500CU. That means that you have to bid at least
500CU, that is, B ≥ Bmin = 500. Thereby bids have to be a multiple of 5CU, that is,
B = 500, 505, 510, 515, 520, . . .
When submitting your bid you do not know the bids of the other bidders nor do they know your
bid.
When all 3 bidders have submitted their bids, the automatical bidding process, which outbids
the bids against each other, starts, and thereby determines the bidder who is awarded the ship.
At this the auction price starts at the minimum bid of Bmin = 500.
The auction price is gradually increased by 5CU at any one time. If a bid is exceeded by the
auction price it quits the auction. The bidding process may end in two ways depending on the
bids:
1. If the highest bid and the second highest bid differ, the bidding process stops when the
auction price exceeds the second highest bid. We denote the remaining highest bid with
B∗ and with P the price at which the bidding process has stopped whereby P equals the
second highest bid. The bidder who submitted the bid B∗ is awarded the ship and has to
pay the price P. In this case P < B∗. That means, that the bidder has to pay less than
his bid B∗.
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2. If at least two bidders have submitted the same bidB∗ which is the highest bid, the bidding
process stops at the price P = B∗. Then one of these bidders is randomly selected to be
awarded the ship at the price P = B∗. In this case the bidder who is awarded the ship
has to pay his bid.
Please note: in this auction you are only allowed to submit a bid once, which may not be
changed afterwards!
Before the auction begins, you are asked some questions on the screen concerning the rules. This
is to assure that all participants have understood the instructions.
C.5 Second page of Treatments A2c and A2u, pricing rule 1
Auction
The auction by which the ship is to be sold has the following rules.
The auction starts with a price of 500CU. You will be asked on your screen, if you are willing
to pay this price for the ship. If this is the case, click on the OK-button on your screen or press
the enter key. You have 50 seconds to do this. If you are not willing to pay this price, do nothing
until the 50 seconds passed. In doing this, you automatically quit the auction. On your screen
you can always see, how many seconds are left until the 50 seconds have expired. Every bidder
makes his decision without knowing the decisions the decisions of the other two bidders.
If at least two bidders are willing to pay the price of 500 CU, the auction price is raised by
5CU. The bidders that are still in the auction then again have 50 seconds to decide, if they are
willing to pay 505 CU for the ship. If again at least two bidders accept, the auction price will
be raised by another 5 CU and so on. The bidding process may end in two ways depending on
the bids:
1. The auction price is raised stepwise by 5 CU until at a price P only one bidder is still in
the auction. That is, there is only one bidder who is willing to buy the ship at the actual
auction price P. This bidder is awarded the ship and has to pay the price P.
2. The auction price is raised stepwise by 5 CU until at a price P at least two bidders are still
in the auction, who, however, all quit at the next price P+ 5 CU. One of these bidders
is randomly selected to be awarded the ship for the price P.
Before the auction begins, you are asked some questions on the screen concerning the rules. This
is to assure that all participants have understood the instructions.
C.6 Second page of Treatments A2c and A2u, pricing rule 2
Auction
The auction by which the ship is to be sold has the following rules.
The auction starts with a price of 500CU. You will be asked on your screen, if you are willing
to pay this price for the ship. If this is the case, click on the OK-button on your screen or press
the enter key. You have 50 seconds to do this. If you are not willing to pay this price, do nothing
until the 50 seconds passed. In doing this, you automatically quit the auction. On your screen
you can always see, how many seconds are left until the 50 seconds have expired. Every bidder
makes his decision without knowing the decisions the decisions of the other two bidders.
If at least two bidders are willing to pay the price of 500 CU, the auction price is raised by
5CU. The bidders that are still in the auction then again have 50 seconds to decide, if they are
willing to pay 505 CU for the ship. If again at least two bidders accept, the auction price will
be raised by another 5 CU.
The auction price is raised stepwise by 5 CU until at a price P at least two bidders are still in
the auction, at the next price P+ 5 CU, however, only one bidder or no bidder is left. That
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is, at the price P+ 5 CU either all or all but one bidder quit. The bidding process stops and
the high bidder or one of the high bidders, if there are more than one, is then awarded the ship.
The price for the ship equals in both cases P CU.
1. If there is only one high bidder, that is, at the price P+ 5 CU all but one bidders quit,
this remaining bidder is awarded the ship and has to pay the price P.
2. If there are several high bidders, who all quit at the price P+ 5 CU, one of these is
randomly selected to be awarded the ship for the price P.
Before the auction begins, you are asked some questions on the screen concerning the rules. This
is to assure that all participants have understood the instructions.
C.7 Second page of Treatments A3c and A3u
Auction
The auction by which the ship is to be sold has the following rules.
The auction starts with a price of 500CU. You will be asked on your screen, if you are willing
to pay this price for the ship. If this is the case, click on the OK-button on your screen or press
the enter key. You have 50 seconds to do this. If you are not willing to pay this price, do nothing
until the 50 seconds passed. In doing this, you automatically quit the auction. On your screen
you can always see, how many seconds are left until the 50 seconds have expired. Every bidder
makes his decision without knowing the decisions the decisions of the other two bidders.
If two or more bidders are willing to pay the price of 500 CU, one of these bidders is randomly
selected as current high bidder, which we refer to as HB500. You are always informed if you
are the current high bidder or not.
The auction price is then raised by 5CU. The bidders that are still in the auction then have
50 seconds to overbid the current high bidder HB500 by accepting the auction price 505 CU.
The current high bidder HB500 is at this not allowed to bid but he remains in the auction, as
a matter of course.
If at the price 505 CU no bidder signals his willingness to buy the ship at this price, the current
high bidder HB500 is awarded the ship and has to pay 500 CU.
If one or several bidders signal their willingness to pay 505 CU, one amongst these is randomly
selected as new current high bidder HB505. After that the auction price is again raised by
5 CU to 510 CU. The bidders that remained in the auction including the former high bidder
HB500 have then again 50 seconds to overbid the current high bidder HB505 by accepting the
auction price 510 CU.
If at least one bidder accepts the auction price 510 CU, the auction price increases to 515 CU,
and so on.
Before the auction begins, you are asked some questions on the screen concerning the rules. This
is to assure that all participants have understood the instructions.
C.8 Second page of Treatments A4c and A4u
Auction
The auction by which the ship is to be sold has the following rules.
The auction starts with a price of 500CU. This price is displayed to you for 5 seconds on your
screen. After that, you will be asked, if you are willing to pay this price for the ship. If this is
the case, click on the OK-button on your screen or press the enter key. You have 45 seconds
to do this. On your screen you can always see, how many seconds are left until the 45 seconds
have expired.
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The bidder, who accepts the price 500 CU first, becomes current high bidder. We refer to
this bidder as HB500. The other bidders may not accept the price 500 CU anymore. You are
always informed if you are the current high bidder or not.
The auction price is then raised by 5CU, even if the 45 seconds have not expired, and the new
state of the auction is shown to you on your screen for 5 seconds. The bidders then have up to
45 seconds to overbid the current high bidder HB500 by accepting the auction price 505 CU.
The current high bidder HB500 is at this not allowed to bid.
If at the price 505 CU no bidder signals his willingness to buy the ship at this price, the current
high bidder HB500 is awarded the ship and has to pay 500 CU.
If a bidder signals his willingness to pay 505 CU, this bidder becomes new current high bidder
HB505. After that the auction price is again raised by 5 CU to 510 CU. Again all bidders but
HB505 can bid at this price and the one who accepts first becomes new high bidder. If, on the
other hand, no bidder accepts at 510 CU, the current high bidder HB505 a awarded the ship
and has to pay 505 CU.
If a bidder bids 510 CU, he becomes new current high bidder HB510 and the auction price
increases to 515 CU, and so on.
Before the auction begins, you are asked some questions on the screen concerning the rules. This
is to assure that all participants have understood the instructions.
C.9 Treatment P1u
Instructions
In the following you are going to participate in an experiment on selling. At this, you will
make your decisions as bidder isolated from the other participants at your computer terminal.
You may earn money in cash. How much you will earn depends on your decisions and on
the decisions of the other participants. The monetary units of account in the experiment are
so-called currency units (CU).
Point of Departure
Imagine that you are the owner of a cruise ship. By its usage this ship yields profits and, thus,
has some value for you. You also have the possibility to sell the ship via a selling process, that
will be explained to you in detail in the following. Besides you, 2 other ship owners, who each
own one ship, participate in this selling process, but only one ship can be sold.
In case you do not sell the ship, its valueW for you will turn out only by its usage. Calculations
show, that the valueW of the ship for you lies uniformly distributed betweenW0 andW1. This
means, that the ship has at least a value of W0 and at most a value of W1 for you, whereby
all values (integers) from W0 to W1 have equal probability.
Please note: the boundaries W0 and W1 are different for every ship owner. Your individual
boundariesW0 andW1 will be communicated to you directly before the selling process on your
screen; the boundaries of the other bidders however are unknown to you.
Payoff
1. In case you do not sell your ship, the value of the ship for you will be determined by draw-
ing a value W out of your uniform distribution over W0 to W1, which then corresponds
to your payoff.
2. In case you sell your ship at price P , this selling price corresponds to your payoff.
Your payoff will be converted into Euro and paid cash to you at the end of the experiment,
whereby 1 CU corresponds to 5 Euro Cent. The payment will be individually and anonymously.
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Selling process
The process by which the ship is to be sold has the following rules.
You submit exactly once at the beginning of the selling process an offer A. With this offer you
express how many CU you want to have at least for the ship.
Offers have to be a multiples of 5CU, that is, A = 100, 105, 110, 115, 120, . . .
When submitting your offer you do not know the offers of the other two vendors nor do they
know your offer.
When all 3 vendors have submitted their offers, the automatical selling process, which outbids
the offers against each other, starts and thereby determines the vendor who is selling the ship.
Hereby, the selling process starts at the highest offer, which is thus eliminated. Then the price
is gradually decreased by 5CU at any one time. If an other offer is reached by the price, this
offer also quits the process. The selling process may end in two ways depending on the offers:
1. If the lowest and the second lowest offer differ, the selling process stops when the price
reaches the second lowest offer. We denote the remaining lowest offer with A∗ and with
P the price at which the selling process has stopped whereby P equals the second lowest
offer. The vendor who submitted the offer A∗ is accepted as seller and sells his ship for
the price P. In this case P > A∗. That means, that the seller receives for his ship more
than what he asked for by his offer A∗.
2. If at least two vendors have submitted the lowest offer A∗, the process stops at the price
P = A∗. Then one of these vendors is randomly selected as seller at the price P = A∗.
In this case the selling price equals the offer of the vendor who sells the ship.
Please note: you are only allowed to submit once an offer at the beginning of the selling
process, which may not be changed afterwards!
Before the selling process begins, you are asked some questions on the screen concerning the
rules. This is to assure that all participants have understood the instructions.
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